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by Robert C. Post*
Derek Bok seems to have struck a nerve. The accusation that
lawyers are parasitic, concerned with issues of distribution rather
than production, resonates with the current national mood, with
its resurgent glorification of the entrepreneur and its abandon-
ment of the social programs of recent decades.
The accusation prompts Robert Kagan and Robert Rosen to
question whether an imaginary "Czar of Personnel" would be
justified in assigning our best and brightest young people to ca-
reers in prestigious corporate law firms. They conclude that such
assignments would be mistaken, since large law firm practice is of
"declining social significance."' Lawyers engaged in such firm
practice no longer "serve as molders of corporate and public pol-
icy, ' 2 but instead have retreated to a narrow and technical legal
craftsmanship.
Thus, whereas Bok complains that lawyers are not productive,
that they do not make "the pie grow larger" but only "decide
how to carve it up,"' Kagan and Rosen issue a different indict-
ment, that lawyers are failing to provide enough ethical and social
guidance to corporate entities. If Bok's accusation is imbued
with the diminished expectations and deflated realism of the
1980s, Kagan and Rosen's retains the high aspirations and moral
promise of the 1960s. They remind us that there is more to life
than efficiency.
Their article thus raises issues quite different than those im-
plied by Bok's dour accusation. To evaluate whether lawyers are
really pulling their social weight, we would have to engage in a
rather hard-nosed assessment of the value we place on our pres-
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ent legal system, with its emphasis on judicial dispute settlement,
its focus on legal entitlements and duties, and its utilization of
the adversary system. But Kagan and Rosen appear uninterested
in this kind of an evaluation.4 They care about whether lawyers
can make a better pie, not simply a bigger one. Their focus is
thus on the extent to which lawyers can and should transcend
their role as mere "expert suppliers of legal information and as
performers of complex and specifically legal tasks," 5 and assume
instead the socially more important role of "independent coun-
selors."6 The question, however, is whether this is indeed a bet-
ter recipe for our social condition.
The question arises because Kagan and Rosen define the role
of "independent counselor" by reference to two special vari-
ables, autonomy and influence. To those familiar with the socio-
logical literature on professionals, these variables have a familiar
ring. Professionals characteristically provide the public with
services which consist of the application of a specialized and ex-
pert knowledge. Since members of the public do not share this
knowledge, they can evaluate its use only with great difficulty.
For this reason, professionals usually require and receive a fair
degree of "autonomy" in the exercise of their professional exper-
tise.7 But professionals, including lawyers, face a tension be-
tween service and autonomy. The concept of autonomy implies
that professional performance can only be evaluated by those
with the expert knowledge prerequisite to informed judgment,
which is to say by the profession itself.8 The concept of service,
on the other hand, implies that the measure of a professional's
4. Kagan and Rosen's indictment is instead carried along by analogies between
lawyers and "the architects hired by the corporation to design a new. . . factory" who
decide "how to achieve specific ends already decided upon by corporate management."
Kagan & Rosen, supra note 1, at 413-14. Even if this were an accurate description of an
architect's role, it would not follow that the profession of architecture is unproductive in
Bok's sense. The social utility of architecture would depend upon the social service
provided by the profession, regardless of whether this service involved only the accom-
plishment of specific ends dictated by others.
5. Id. at 440.
6. Id. at 426.
7. See M. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 7-13 (1981); Scott, Professionals in Bureau-
cracies: Areas of Conflict, in PROFESSIONALIZATION 265 (H.M. Vollmer & D.L. Mills eds.
1966).
8. See MOORE, THE PROFkSSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 87-106 (1970); Rueschemeyer,
Professional Autonomy and the Social Control of Expertise, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFES-
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performance should be the satisfaction of client needs.9 The ulti-
mate importance of this service to the public is one measure of a
profession's "influence."
The most intriguing aspect of Kagan and Rosen's paper is
that they want to liberate the concepts of autonomy and influence
from this traditional and restricted context, and to fill them with
new and special meaning. They are quite clear that by lawyer
autonomy they do not mean the ability to exercise the independ-
ent judgment necessary for the practice of a technical craft. They
mean instead a lawyer's ability to transcend issues of merely
"legal" consequence and to offer instead "autonomous evalua-
tion of social consequences, political wisdom, or good business
practices."'" For Kagan and Rosen, lawyer autonomy lies in the
freedom to give advice based upon "standards rooted in the law,
public policy, and common conceptions of fair dealing.""
Kagan and Rosen are somewhat less clear in their definition
of "influence." At times they speak as though lawyers have influ-
ence if their services are important to a client and involve "fate-
ful" rather than "peripheral" matters.' 2 At other times they
speak of lawyers having influence if they "have the ear" of their
clients, if their advice is actually followed.' 3 Both these senses of
"influence" are compatible with the traditional image of the law-
yer as a professional with a limited and technical legal expertise.
Sometimes this expertise is important to the client,' 4 and some-
times it is not. It depends upon a variety of factors, including the
relevance of the law to the client. If legal expertise is important
to a corporate client, one can expect that it will attend to the
advice of its lawyer.
To determine if lawyers have these kinds of "influence," one
9. See M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: AJUDICIAL ANALYSIS x-xii (1977);
D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 7-28 (1974); Jones v. Barnes,
103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
10. Kagan & Rosen, supra note 1, at 436-37.
11. Id. at 420. I do not mean to draw this distinction too sharply. It might reason-
ably be argued, for example, that the provision of even strictly "legal" advice requires an
understanding of general social, political, or business practices. Kagan and Rosen ap-
pear to define autonomy, however, in terms of the ability to draw upon such general
understandings in ways not specifically necessary for the provision of legal services.
12. Id at 416.
13. Id at 406.
14. For example, when lawyers "are called upon to advise corporations with wholly
unfamiliar territory, such as their first encounter with a 'hostile takeover,' beginning
trade with the Peoples' Republic of China, or attempting to protect property interests in
post-revolutionary Iran." Id. at 425.
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would have to closely examine the relationship between corpora-
tions and their legal environment. But this is not what Kagan
and Rosen have in mind, and so I think that they ultimately mean
something quite different by the concept of "influence." They
mean that lawyers have influence if they affect a "client's goals
and policies."' 5 For Kagan and Rosen, a lawyer is "influential" if
he does not merely take orders from the corporate managers he
advises, but rather helps to develop these very policies.' 6 Note
that in this sense the concept of "influence" transcends the tradi-
tional image of the legal professional, in which, to quote from the
ABA's new Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers are required
to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation."7
Kagan and Rosen thus propose that lawyers become in-
dependent counselors who offer advice that is not restricted to
issues of legal expertise, but ranges instead over a large spectrum
of business, social, and ethical judgment, and who do not merely
take orders from their clients, but rather attempt to use their
judgment as a basis for altering their clients' objectives. The pro-
posal is interesting and radical because it so deeply transforms
our usual notion of a professional. As Kagan and Rosen note,
"In one sense. . . the image of the autonomous and influential
attorney is not a 'professional' one."' 8
In another sense, however, Kagan and Rosen make the im-
portant claim that the definition of a professional role is histori-
cally contingent,' 9 and that it is therefore not self-defining. Their
complaint is that in recent years lawyers have adopted an unduly
limited and technical definition of their role.20 This definition is
not necessitated by the market for legal services, since lawyers
hold a monopoly and can impose on their clients their own defi-
nition of proper professional service, and since "professions tra-
ditionally have justified their privileged position by the claim that
professional standards, not merely client demand, govern their
15. Id. at 419-20.
16. Id.
17. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
18. Kagan & Rosen, supra note 1, at 430.
19. For illuminating examples of previous professional definitions of the lawyer's
role, see Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, in PRO-
FESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (G. Geison ed. 1983); R. FERGU-
SON, LAW AND LETI'ERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984).
20. Kagan & Rosen, supra note 1, at 422.
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work."' 21 What is needed, Kagan and Rosen imply, are new pro-
fessional standards that incorporate the values of autonomy and
influence.
This implication is at the core of Kagan and Rosen's paper.
The difficult and important question that it raises is whether the
values of autonomy and influence, as defined by Kagan and Ro-
sen, can or should serve as the basis for a professional ethos. Re-
call that the very raison d'etre of a profession is its claim to special
expertise. Lawyers claim to know the law, and it is upon this
claim that their status as professionals rests. For Kagan and Ro-
sen's position to be accepted, it must be established that lawyers
can claim a similar expertise with respect to matters of business,
social, and ethical judgment.2 2 Kagan and Rosen's position ap-
pears to be that lawyers should be encouraged to express such
judgments in their professional capacity, and that clients should
attend to such judgments as they would to the advice of a
professional.
I have two reservations about this position. First, I doubt
whether such judgments can be made the subject of professional
expertise. Certainly "general principles of equity, fair dealing,
and public policy" are not susceptible to privileged "profes-
sional" insight. They pose instead general issues of right and
wrong, of tact and judgment, that are open to the perception of
professional and nonprofessional alike. This does not mean that
they are issues without answers, only that there is no particular
reason to trust an expert's answer.
Second, I doubt whether it would be desirable to commit such
issues to expert resolution. The twentieth century has witnessed
a continual tug-of-war between the prerogatives of expertise and
the principles of democracy.2 The expert claims to have special
knowledge of public policy; the democrat maintains that value-
laden issues pose political questions that must be decided by the
people themselves. There is much to be said on both sides, but
the point I wish to emphasize is that the professionalization of
21. Ia- at 440.
22. Kagan and Rosen develop their insight in the area of corporate practice where
these are the relevant variables to describe influence and autonomy. In other contexts,
other variables may be appropriate. For example, if lawyers were to exercise autonomy
and influence in the area of divorce law, it might be on the basis of a claimed expertise in
family psychology.
23. See, e.g., E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURAL-
ISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 95-114 (1973).
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knowledge has its costs. Inquiry that becomes the subject of ex-
pert prerogative tends to become depoliticized, which means that
it slips from the arena of public discussion, and its roots in ethics
and public policy fade from public awareness. This may not be a
good thing. I, for one, would think it very unfortunate if lawyers
were to be perceived as "experts" in matters involving business,
social, or ethical judgments, so that members of the public would
feel incompetent to challenge such judgments or to perceive and
debate the values that underlie them.
For these reasons I do not agree that lawyers should strive for
professional standards that incorporate the values of autonomy
and influence, as Kagan and Rosen have defined them. This is
not to say, however, that professional standards should discourage
lawyers from exercising autonomy and influence, so long as this
is done without the pretense of professional authority. 24 As Ka-
gan and Rosen suggest, it would be a great loss if those who as-
sume the prerogatives of the profession must simultaneously lose
their human prerogative to exercise these important values.
That would be a poor recipe for a desirable social life. And in
this context, Kagan and Rosen perform a valuable service indeed
by detailing the many ways in which the social conditions of legal
practice and the currents of professional culture tend toward this
unfortunate result.
24. The new ABA rules permit the exercise of autonomy: "In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to a client's situation." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983). Although the rules presuppose a situation in
which clients set objectives and lawyers implement them, they do not directly forbid the
exercise of influence. See id. at Rule 1.2 and Comment (1); Rule 1.14 and comment (1).
There is always a question, however, whether a trusting client can distinguish advice
based upon professional expertise and advice based upon a lawyer's exercise of auton-
omy and desire for influence.
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